The desire to understand the mechanisms of market information integration motivates this study. Large sample experimental prediction markets with varying feedback mechanisms afforded the study of aggregate and individual's actions. Markets without feedback demonstrated information collection by outperforming the average of their participants. When feedback was introduced the inductive process of information aggregation was observed. This process was seen to simultaneously increase the amount of information assimilated, but also introduce information mirages which tend to decrease the accuracy of the markets -being dependent on the type of data presented to the market. In fact, a market subject to mirage prone data resembles a prisoner's dilemma where individual rationality results in collective irrationality. Individual's responses with feedback revealed characteristics of public and private information integration. Integration for individuals was subtle compared to the more distinct effect in markets, illustrating the emergent nature of information aggregation in markets.
Introduction
The desire to understand the mechanisms of market information integration motivates this study. Three questions are posed:
1 What are the mechanisms involved in the information integration process?
2 How does the presence and type of feedback impact these mechanisms? 3 How do individuals use information and can their processes explain the market level phenomenon?
The methods of experimental economics were used in an online prediction market. The market used herein was inspired by the design of Plott et al. (2003) . Participants were recruited from Amazon's Mechanical Turk (http://www.mturk.com) in order to generate a large sample. All conditions (market parameters and participants choices) were recorded for analysis. Prediction markets (also called predictive markets, information markets, decision markets, idea futures, event derivatives and virtual markets) are a type of market that can be used to harness the wisdom of crowds. Viewed as a futures market, it is designed to generate information about a future event. Typically, an instrument (e.g., a futures contract) is created whose final value is tied to this event; market prices are interpreted as estimations of the probability of the event or its expected value. Prediction markets may offer financial incentives and provide anonymity to overcome some of the barriers to sharing of information.
Information integration, or assimilation as it is referred to in the present research, can be considered to consist of two distinct tasks:
• collection: individuals bringing together their diverse sets of information and their personal methods to interpret that information
• conclusion: the group collectively making a judgment about what that information means.
Some authors use the combined terms of disseminate and aggregate to convey the multiple tasks. However, in other cases, only aggregation is used. One could argue that the word aggregate may not precisely convey both functions. In the present research we use the term assimilate to mean the combined function of collecting information and making a judgment about what that collected information means. We generally refer to aggregation as the inductive process of judging the collected information. The idea that a market can integrate information goes back to some of the fundamental concepts of classical economics. Smith's (1776) invisible hand and Hayek's (1945) giant processing machine for decentralised information allude to the information processing capability of markets. The ideas were more fully developed with the theory of rational expectations and the efficient market hypothesis.
The theory of rational expectations states that agents, acting with complete access to the relevant information, forecast events in the future without bias. Any errors then would be due to random events. The theory is generally attributed to the American economist John Muth (1961) . Grossman (Grossman, 1981; Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980) performed the theoretical analysis to show that under conditions of asymmetric information, the theory of rational expectations leads to effective aggregation of information by a market. It is worth noting that the rational expectations hypothesis does not assume every decision of each individual is rational. Rather it assumes that the sum of all decisions by all market participants has no systematic bias and uses all relevant information in the formation of the expectation.
The theory of rational expectations can then be used to build the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1965) . The efficient market hypothesis asserts that markets are efficient in terms of the prices, that is, the price reflects all known relevant information. If the theory is strictly correct, then it would not be possible to outperform the market. Since all known information is integrated into prices, only unknowable new information can affect prices and thus prices should be described by a random walk [a hypothesis made by Bachelier (1900) in his dissertation 60 years prior]. Plott and Sunder (1988) empirically showed that properly designed markets can indeed aggregate information. The topic of information aggregation remains a current research focus (cf. Bennouri et al., 2011; Veiga and Vorsatz, 2010) .
Information cascades, or information mirages, have been proposed as an explanation of herding behaviour in markets (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992) . To understand this mechanism consider a simple example. Individuals must choose between two doors, A and B, one correct and one not correct. They are each given private probabilistic information on which is the correct choice. This private information is not shared directly however their decisions are visible to the other participants. Consider the situation where the private information has probability of 2/3 of being correct. You are the third person to make a choice and your information indicates B has a higher probability of being the correct choice. However, you see the first and second person choose A before you must make your selection. Assuming everyone is using Bayes' theorem one might reason as follows: the prior probabilities are 50/50 and the first person in line had no information other than their own private information so application of Bayes' theorem would suggest they follow their private signal. So, that would imply the first person had private signal which indicated door A was correct. The second person would have also assumed that the first person's private signal was door A. If their private information was door B Bayes' theorem would suggest that both doors have equal probability. Making a second assumption that in the case of equal posterior probabilities the second person makes their prediction based on their private signal indicates that by also choosing door A, their private signal was also door A. Now it is your turn to choose. If the two previous private signals were indeed door A, then application of Bayes' theorem would suggest ignoring your private signal of door B and choosing door A. At this point the information cascade has begun. All the following individuals have the same data from the first two participants as well as all who preceded them who would have continued to choose door A. Information cascades have been extensively studied and have a rich literature (cf. Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003, for a review) .
Experiments have validated (cf. Anderson and Holt, 1997) , in general, the predictions of information cascade theory. There are several important caveats to these experiments however. First, they represent a carefully controlled experiment where the known probabilities are available to all participants (in this case, balls are selected from urns with known frequencies). So while the participants did not know the exact information of others, they did know the nature of that information. This differs from the 'real world' in that market participants have no idea of the nature of others' information. The second caveat is there are always a few participants who do not act in accordance with the theory (e.g., do not take the Bayesian rational option).
Visibility of the actions of others provides feedback in a market structure. A feedback loop is a series of connections within a system which affects itself (Sterman, 2000) . The type of feedback, either positive or negative, is determined by the type of the effect. In a system with a positive feedback loop, a perturbation at the input of the system will be increased as it travels around the loop. In a system with negative feedback the perturbation will be decreased as it travels around the loop. In the perspective of the efficient market hypothesis, the communication of price to current market participants creates a negative feedback cycle. As market participants assess their information, they develop an expectation of the price. If the market price they observe is greater than this expectation they will take actions which tend to decrease the market price (that is, they may sell the item if they own it). By the same reasoning, if their expectation is lower than the current market price, they will take actions which tend to increase the market price (that is, they may buy the item). By contrast, in the information mirage example, the information of prior individual's actions creates a positive feedback cycle between prior and current participants. As more participants make the same choice it encourages subsequent participant to make the same choice.
Experimental design

Experimental prediction market
The market used in the present research is a simplified version of the prediction market studied by Plott et al. (2003) . Participants were given private data and, depending on the market structure, were able to observe how other participants had acted -public data. The private data consists of a set of draws from an urn.
The prediction market used by Plott et al. was modified to accommodate an on-line asynchronous experimental design. Two restrictions were added:
• Each participant is given a set order and must allocate all their tickets at that time.
Generally, participants would prefer to place their tickets later in the process. However, if the scope of their activity is a series of markets, and the participant's position in the allocation queue is randomly chosen, then, on average, no participant would be disadvantaged over their entire series of markets.
• Each participant must allocate all of their tickets. While not a requirement of the markets used by Plott et al. (2003) , it is conceptually consistent with the these markets since there was no benefit to holding unallocated tickets at the end of the market since they did not carry over to the next market.
Rather than assembling all participants together, the modified structure allows participants to respond asynchronously -thereby greatly boosting the ability to gather large numbers of responses. The specific operation of the market will be described next. To begin, the correct state of nature, that which participants are attempting to ascertain, is chosen at random from an urn (or bingo cage) consisting of six balls -here considered simply to be letters A through F. Suppose this random selection chooses B to be the correct state. A second urn (or bingo cage) would then be populated with a bias based on the first draw -five B balls, and two balls of each of the other types. Each market participant is then given the results of three draws, with replacement, from the second bingo cage. Figure 1 illustrates the operation of a market. The first set of three draws from the biased bingo cage is E, B and F. This set of three draws will be called here a draw set. These draw sets are the private information of the participants. Each participant is given an allocation of 100 tickets to distribute across the six states. The participant's task is to allocate these tickets in the best way given their particular set of information. As the market begins, the first participant is given his private information (draw set) of E, B, F. He sees the prior allocation is all 0 and can understand that he is the first market participant. For this example, imagine he allocates his 100 tickets as 12 to state A, eight to state B and C, 16 to state D and E and 40 to state F. The next participant is shown a draw set of C, D, A and the public information, the total accumulated ticket allocation by prior respondents, of {12, 8, 8, 16, 16, 40} (the values allocated to states A through F respectively). They would then allocate their 100 tickets based on this information. In this illustration they allocated tickets as {24, 10, 23, 23, 10, 10} to states A through F. The total accumulated number of tickets becomes {36, 18, 31, 39, 26, 50}. These are the totals which would be shown to participant 3 along with their draw set of F, D, E. ( )
The probabilities for the market are calculated and shown in Table 1 using the same format as Plott et al. (2003) . There are three possible types of draws: all three balls match (e.g., AAA, BBB, CCC, etc.); two balls match (e.g., AAB, AAD, BBC, etc.); or none of the balls match (e.g., ABE, CDF, AEF, etc.). These three types are shown as the rows in the table. For the first row, all balls match, then the posterior probability that the ball type received is the correct state is calculated to be 75.8% (that is, if the experiment of drawing balls from the urn were repeated a large number of times, 75.8% of the time that three matching balls was received, the type of ball received would be the type with five balls in the urn -the correct state). Still, it is possible to draw three balls of the incorrect state (that is, with two balls in the urn). This will happen 4.8% of the time. Again, the urn contains five balls of the correct state of nature and two balls of each of the other states. The payout structure used in this design is a fixed winnings design, that is a lottery which provides a fixed payout for each correct ticket (Shelley, 1989) . This is in contrast to the parimutuel system used by Plott (2003) .
Experimental process
A flow chart of the survey is shown in Figure 2 . Participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk. After consent and a short set of demographic questions they participated in two incentivised poll markets. Next, they were randomly assigned to one of the feedback groups -either being shown total accumulated tickets as a frequency or as a percentage of the total. After completing these four markets they completed a short set of survey questions. Two experiments were conducted, random draws and mirage prone dataset. The primary difference was the draw tables used. Draw tables can be produced prior to the market implementation and individual draw sets taken sequentially from them.
For the random draws experiment, hundreds of draw tables were produced with Matlab's 'rand' command which uses the Ziggurat algorithm (Marsaglia and Tsang, 2000) . These draw tables were then used sequentially as the experiment progressed. The same draw tables were applied to each market type (no-feedback, frequency feedback and percent feedback).
In the mirage prone draw set experiment, one draw table was reused for all markets. To select the draw table for this experiment a large number of possible draw tables were generated. These draw tables were processed through a simulator to analyse the potential performance of each draw table in different prediction markets. Table 2 shows the draw table to be used in the experiment. Here, A is the correct state. For example, the first participant would receive a draw set of D, F, D. The second participant would receive a draw set of E, F, D.
Table 2
Experimental draw table for mirage prone draw experiment This particular draw table was chosen due to its ability to generate mirages in the simulator environment. Compared to the urn, the signal for the correct state is weaker (25% vs. 33.3% for the correct state in the case of 12 draw sets). Furthermore, the draws for the correct state come later in the draw table. While the simulator showed this has no effect in a market without feedback, the simulator demonstrated that this arrangement is capable of producing information mirages in feedback markets.
Procedures
The experimental procedures are discussed. For more details see Jolly (2011) .
Subjects
The random draws experiment was conducted from July 11, 2011 to July 27, 2011. 503 participants were used in the analysis. Participants earned a base of $0.10 and a bonus based on their performance. The bonus was calculated as their total number of correct tickets divided by their total tickets times $1.50 (the mean bonus amount was $0.108). Screening was used in this experiment is described in Section 3.3.
The mirage prone draw experiment was conducted over a five-day period from November 9, 2010 to November 13, 2010. 228 completed the survey. Each participant that finished was paid $0.15 plus a bonus based on performance. The bonus was calculated as their total number of correct tickets divided by their total tickets times $1. Table 3 shows the data collection statistics. Table 3 Survey data collection summary
Random draws experiment Mirage prone data
Data collection period 7/11/11 to 7/27/11 11/9/10 to 11/13/10 
Experimental evaluation methods
The metrics used in the data analysis will be described.
The entropy of the final distribution of allocated tickets can be used as a measure of the certainty, or the conviction, of the prediction. The entropy is computed as:
is the probability associated with a particular state and is simply the tickets allocated to the state divided by the total number of allocated tickets. The log nature of Entropy tends to compress differences. The minimum value of entropy is 0 which occurs when all tickets are allocated on one state. The maximum entropy is 2.585 which occurs when tickets are evenly distributed across the six possible states. Several descriptive tests have also been used to describe differences in distributions (Plott et al., 2003) . The Wurtz number will be used in the present study (Wurtz, 1997) as defined by:
where p and q are the probabilities of each state (that is, the observed ticket allocation divided by the total). This metric was chosen because it is well behaved for allocations of 0 tickets. Plot et al. (2003) describe a measure they termed aggregate information available (AIA). AIA is simply the Bayesian posterior probability if all draws which have been distributed are known. In the market used for the present research, the AIA is a distribution of probabilities across the six states. Of particular interest is the Wurtz distance between a given cumulative allocation in a market and the AIA distribution. This gives a measure of how close the allocation is to perfect assimilation of information.
To evaluate the effect of different draw sets a quantitative method of evaluating the draw set is needed. As a draw set progresses through the draws the AIA value will eventually signal the correct Urn state with a high probability. A Wurtz distance can be calculated between the current AIA and the final AIA. Evaluating this as a time series can be a valuable way to study and characterise draw sets. Consider the draw set illustrated in Figure 3 . This plot shows the Wurtz distance between the current AIA and the final AIA (after 20 draws) at each stage (participant) in the draw set. In this example the correct state is F. Many early draws of F, quickly drive the AIA to a high probability for state F. By draw number 7, the probability that the correct state is F has reached nearly 100%. 
Notes: Many draws are required to reach the AIA asymptote. The x axis of the graph is the market stage (or number of participants).
Contrast this to the draw set illustrated in Figure 4 . The correct state is E. It takes nearly 13 draws before the correct state is predicted with greater than 80% probability. It is anticipated that the shape of the path towards the asymptotic value of AIA will influence feedback prediction markets. A simple quantitative metric which could be used to characterise this aspect of the draw set is simply the sum of these AIA Wurtz distances as shown in the equation below. This can be thought of as a measure of the area under the curves. The sum of the Wurtz distances for the draw set in Figure 3 is 1.00 while the sum for the draw set in Figure 4 is 7.29.
The cumulative allocation of tickets reflects the market's results. A two stage statistical test for significance of the results will be employed for the present study. In the first phase the accumulated results will be compared to a uniform distribution to determine if there is any information in the distribution. In the second phase the two states with the largest distributions will be compared for significance of the mode. This method is analogous to the use of ANOVA to test for significance on a group of means and then post-hoc tests to determine which means are statistically different. The method is illustrated in Table 4 . In this example, the cumulative allocation across states is {10, 20, 100, 40, 80, 50}. With a total of 300 tickets allocated, this allocation is compared to a uniform allocation of 50 tickets per state. With standard categorical data analysis the resulting p-value obtained from the Chi-square distribution is less than 0.05, so the allocation is deemed to have information content. In the second phase, the mode of 100 tickets on state C is tested against the second highest allocation, 80 tickets on state E. These are compared against a uniform distribution of the tickets across the two state (in this case 90 tickets on each). Here categorical data analysis yields a p-value which is greater than 0.05. Therefore, in this example, the mode is not significantly different than the second highest allocation. This process was used to describe a result as being in one of three possible states:
1 not significant -p-value of first or second test is > .05 2 correct -p-value of both first and second test is < .05 and the mode is correct 3 incorrect -p-value of both first and second test is < .05 and the mode is incorrect.
In terms of a market type's performance, two interesting metrics can be calculated using the categorisation of correct, incorrect and not significant: decisiveness and correctness. These metrics are defined below: For example, consider an experiment where a market structures is tested in multiple trials with the results shown in Table 5 . In this example, the decisiveness and correctness can be calculated as ( ) 1 1 40% 5
Number correct Number incorrect Decisiveness
Total number of markets
Number correct Correctness
Number correct Number incorrect
Decisiveness is a representation of the market type's ability to make a judgment. Correctness is the probability that this judgment is correct. Both are important considerations for a prediction market designer. Decisiveness and correctness values from two different test cases will be compared for statistically significant differences using the Fisher's exact test on the contingency tables shown in Table 6 and Table 7   Table 6 Contingency table to test differences in decisiveness Non-parametric inferential tools were generally used. Two by two contingency tables were evaluated with Fisher's (1954) exact test due to its superior performance when entries are small. Differences in means were generally tested using Mann-WhitneyWilcoxon U test (Mann and Whitney, 1947) to avoid any issues with the assumptions of underlying distribution characteristics. Generally, inferential tests assume independence between observations. Due to the nature of the experimental procedure, each participant participated in multiple markets. Due to the staggered start, no two markets had the exact same set of participants. However, there was some amount of overlap. While this is not a major challenge to the significance test results, this overlap produces some weakening of the independence assumption of most inferential tests. The authors are unaware of any correction for this slight bias, so readers should keep in mind that results may not be as strong as the p-value suggests.
Screening
Some workers may use Amazon Mechanical Turk as a means to provide substantial supplemental income. Since workers are paid per task completed, there can be internally generated pressure on participants to complete as many tasks as possible in the time they have available to work. Other researchers have reported careless responses in their experiments (Paolacci et al., 2010) . This behaviour was also inferred in the present study. Screening participants is an option to control careless responses. Two screening methods were employed in the random draws experiment. First, participants who failed the attention test (a Likert scale question which simply asked the participant to select 'strongly agree') were screened. Second, participants were screened based on their response in a benchmark no-feedback market. Screened participants completed the survey as would a non-screened participant. They were also paid the base compensation as well as the bonus. However, screened participant's data was not included in the general database and therefore was not incorporated into the markets.
For the second screening, participants were presented a no-feedback market allocation choice. A constant draw set of ECE (that is, two E balls and one C ball) was used. Their allocation was compared to four theoretical distributions as shown in Table 8 . The Wurtz distance between the participant's allocation and each of these distributions was then calculated. The minimum of these Wurtz distance was then compared to 0.25. If the minimum Wurtz distance was greater than 0.25 the participant's results were not stored in the main database and were effectively screened from later participants. 
Results
Results from markets
Result 1: Markets without feedback can collect information and outperform the individuals.
Support:
The ability of a market to collect information can be studied in the no-feedback markets. Table 10 gives the results comparing the correctness and decisiveness of all individual allocations to the cumulative allocations in the no feedback markets. Markets have higher correctness and decisiveness. Both of these results are statistically significant at the 5% level. Result 2: Feedback markets have an inductive process, above and beyond collection, which allows them to assimilate more information than markets without feedback.
Support: Markets with and without feedback can be compared to assess the effect of the information aggregation mechanism. Table 11 shows the summary statistics of the entropy distributions of the final ticket allocations after all 20 participants. Feedback markets are seen to have lower entropy than no-feedback markets, with this difference being statistically significant at the 5% level. In addition to the mean differences the table shows that the standard deviation of the feedback markets is descriptively approximately twice as large as for the no-feedback markets. The Levene's (1960) test p-value is also shown which test for the homogeneity of variance of the two distributions. This test is significant at the 5% level after stage 2, indicating a non-homogenous variance. The distance between the market cumulative allocation and the AIA distribution (recall the AIA distribution is determined by calculating the Bayesian posterior probability of the cumulative ball draws) is another indication of the inductive market aggregation mechanism. As the market distribution approaches the AIA distribution it can be judged that the market has done a better job at aggregating the available information. Table 12 gives the mean Wurtz distance between the final market cumulative allocation and the associated AIA distribution. This shows that feedback markets (frequency and percent feedback combined) exhibit a lower Wurtz distance to the AIA than no-feedback markets. This difference is statistically significant at the 5% level. This indicates that feedback markets are getting closer to the AIA distribution, which is one evaluation of the correct result. Result 3: Information mirages are present in markets with feedback. They are an artefact of the inductive process. These mirages are an error mechanism which reduces the market's overall accuracy.
Support: Three analysis will be shown to support this result: qualitative analysis of markets which reach an incorrect conclusion; results from the random draws experiment; and, results from the mirage prone draw experiment.
Qualitative support for Result 3:
Examining individual market progression can illustrate some of the dynamics taking place in markets which come to a statistically significant but incorrect conclusion. Table 13 gives the relevant details for a frequency feedback market. The cumulative number of draws for the six states in this draw set are {6, 8, 11, 10, 17, 8}. The correct state, E, has a total of 17 draws while state D, the eventual erroneous prediction, has ten draws. The mirage begins early with the second participant. He receives two draws of state D and makes a rational allocation of 50 tickets on that state. Participant 3, who receives a draw of BFB places 30 tickets on D even though it was not in his draw as a result of the large public allocation on that state. Participant 4, who receives a strong draw for the correct state, makes a temperate allocation to that state and puts 17 tickets on state D even though it was not in his draw. Participant 13 is also significant in that he allocates 70 tickets on state D given a single draw. An important characteristic of this draw set is the lack of draws on the correct state from participant 3 through participant 10. This allows the mirage to build as eight draws to the error state occur in that span. 
Random draws experiment support for Result 3:
Previously a metric the 'sum of AIA distances' was introduced to characterise draw sets. A larger sum of AIA distances indicates a draw set which is more prone to information mirages because the random nature of the draws takes longer to achieve an AIA distribution which gives high probability to the correct state. This metric was compared to the Wurtz distance between final AIA and the cumulative allocation which is a measure of how well the market has performed (with perfect information assimilation the cumulative allocation will equal AIA). Figure 6 shows a scatter plot of these two metrics for each market in the random draws experiment broken out as feedback (circles) vs. no-feedback markets (asterisks). 
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It would be expected that draw sets with larger 'sum of AIA distances' would have a higher chance of developing information mirages. Regression models were developed for the two data sets. The dotted blue (feedback) and solid red (no-feedback) lines show the result of linear regression fit to the data points. The feedback markets exhibit a positive slope, indicating the Wurtz distance between the final cumulative allocation and the AIA distribution is increasing as the metric 'Sum of AIA distances' increases. For no-feedback markets, no slope is observed. For feedback markets the slope coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level (p = 0.0112). For the no-feedback markets the slope coefficient is not statistically significant at the 5% level (p = 0.8666). This indicates the hypothesised relationship exists for feedback markets and, as expected, does not exist for no-feedback markets.
Mirage prone draw set experiment support for Result 3:
The mirage tendency of the draw set can be illustrated in Table 14 and Table 15. Table 14 shows the draw sets at each stage (participant) as well as the AIA posterior probability given the cumulative draws. Note that for stages one through eight, D is the most likely state (largest AIA probability). From stages 9-13, state A, which is the urn correct state, becomes the most likely. Table 15 illustrates the cumulative allocation if participants had access to all accumulated draws and they allocated their 100 tickets in direct proportion to the AIA posterior probability. Even with these rational responses, an information mirage would develop on state D.
Table 14
Mirage prone draw set and AIA posterior probability (see online version for colours) The relationship between the average allocation of tickets and the draw characteristics can shed some light on the information mirage effect. Table 16 shows the characteristics of the mirage prone draw set. After all 13 draw sets, the urn correct state, A, has the largest sum of draws with a count of 12. State D, has the next largest count with 7. The order weighted sum of draws has a different order. State D, by virtue of the draws occurring early in the set has a larger metric than state A. In an information mirage, earlier draws are more influential since allocations to these states may cause later participants to allocate more tickets to that state. The weighting factor studied here is a simple linear function as shown, with the first draw weighted at 13 (the total number of stages) and the final draw weighted at 1. The equations are shown below. where i is the draw set index (e.g., i = 1 is the first draw set) and N is the total number of draws (N = 13 for the mirage prone draw set). The average cumulative allocation of all participants passing the attention test are then calculated by market type (Table 16 ). This shows that in no-feedback markets, the largest cumulative allocation after the final stage is on state A, the urn correct state and the state with the largest sum of draws. By contrast the largest average cumulative allocation after stage 13 in the feedback markets was 267.4 for state D. State D has the largest order weighted sum of draws (69). The relationship is further explored through regression between the mean cumulative allocations and both the sum of draws and the order weighted sum of draws. Table 17 shows the slope coefficient and its associated p-value of a linear regression of the mean cumulative allocation and both the sum of draws and the order weighted sum of draws. This analysis shows that the regression slope for the sum of draws is statistically significant at the 10% level for each stage and is significant at the 5% level for many stages including the final stage. By contrast, the regression vs. the order-weighted sum of draws for the later stages (stages 10-13) are not statistically significant at the 10% level. For no-feedback markets, the average cumulative allocations fit the sum of draws better than the order weighted sum of draws.
Table 17
Summary of linear regression results
Linear coefficient p-value No feedback markets N = 33 markets, 429 responses
Fit to sum of draws 11.9 0.012 Fit to sum of order weighted draws 1.3 0.232
Feedback markets N = 58 markets, 754 responses
Fit to sum of draws 6.8 0.184 Fit to sum of order weighted draws 1.8 0.002 Table 17 also gives the same information for the feedback markets. Here the relationships have changed. In the later stages (stage 9-13) the relationship between the average cumulative allocation and the sum of draws are not statistically significant at the 10% level. However, for all stages, the average cumulative allocation and the order weighted sum of draws is statistically significant at the 5% level.
Result 4:
The presence and type of feedback can modulate the induction process -more informative feedback increases precision at the cost of accuracy.
Support: Table 18 shows the performance of the markets categorised as correct, incorrect or not significant as described previously using significance level of 0.05. No-feedback markets show no incorrect results. However, approximately 42% (20 out of 48) are unable to be judged as statistically significant. Feedback markets have fewer not-significant results (12/43 or 28% for percentage feedback markets and 5/46 or 11% for frequency feedback markets) but produce more incorrect results as well. The markets' performance can be compared using the decisiveness and correctness metrics. Table 19 shows these metrics for the no-feedback markets and the feedback markets (combining percent and frequency). Differences are compared with the categorical methods described earlier. Markets with feedback have statistically significant larger decisiveness while markets without feedback have statistically significant larger correctness. Table 20 gives the decisiveness and correctness for percent and frequency feedback markets. Descriptively, percent feedback markets have higher correctness and lower decisiveness than frequency feedback markets. This difference is statistically significant for decisiveness but not for correctness. No-feedback markets offer a perfect correctness, but at the expense of limited decisiveness. Frequency feedback markets exhibit the greatest decisiveness, but at the cost of some errors. Percent feedback markets, which moderate the feedback to some extent, slightly improve the correctness at the cost of some decisiveness. These results illustrate the fundamental trade-off between these two market types. The feedback is enabling the induction process which is allowing the markets to reach a conclusion more often (decisiveness). However, the induction process, which makes the markets subject to information mirages, adversely impacts the correctness of those judgments. Figure 8 shows the decisiveness and correctness results for the no-feedback and feedback markets by market stage. No-feedback market decisiveness is quite stable after seven participants. However, the correctness continues to rise until it reaches 100% at stage 16.
By contrast, decisiveness for feedback markets appears to keep rising over most of the experiment with a plateau being reached quite late in the experiment. Feedback market correctness appears to reach a maximum after approximately 15 participants.
Results from individual actions
Result 5: In the absence of feedback, participants allocate above the Bayesian posterior probability in low probability situations and below the Bayesian posterior probability in high probability situations Support: Table 21 summarises the mean and standard deviation of the allocations for no-feedback markets by number of balls drawn in the draw set. Figure 9 is a box plot of each individual allocation versus the corresponding Bayesian probability as derived from the three ball draws for the IP markets. The Bayesian probabilities are at discrete values because there are only three types of ball draws (all balls the same, two balls the same or all balls different) which breaks down to 7 different probabilities (see Table 1 ). The line where the allocation is equal to the Bayesian Probability has been drawn on the figure. Any allocation above this line could be considered an over allocation to the probability and any allocation below the line could be considered an under allocation to the probability. A least squares linear regression was performed and the resulting regression line is also drawn. The regression line (with statistically significant slope) indicates that participants have a bias which creates over allocation for low probability situations and an under allocation for higher probability draws. One possible explanation for this effect is the well studied tendency for individuals to overestimate the probability of low probability events and underestimate the probability of high probability events (Hastie and Dawes, 2001 ).
Result 6:
In the presence of public data, participants allocate tickets by integrating public and private data.
Support:
The influence of public information on the allocation by participants is studied. In this analysis the allocations are grouped by the number of balls drawn for a particular state. To illustrate the method, consider an individual who has a ball draw of ECE and is presented a public cumulative allocation of {55, 32, 110, 21, 11, 71} . This participant has been shown a total of 300 tickets. In terms of percent of this total the cumulative allocations would be: A:18.3%; B:10.7%; C:36.7%; D:7.0%; E:3.7%; and, F:23.7%. For this illustration, imagine the participant allocated their own tickets as {4, 3, 40, 3, 40, 10}. Then for the groups the following data points would be added:
1 0 balls drawn group:
• state A -allocation: 4; public: 18.3%
• state B -allocation: 3; public: 10.7%
• state D -allocation: 3; public: 7.0%
• state F -allocation: 10; public: 23.7% 2 1 ball drawn group:
• state C -allocation: 40, public: 36.7% 3 2 balls drawn group:
• state E -allocation: 40, public: 3.7% 4 3 balls drawn group:
• no data points added since this situation did not occur.
Each allocation can thus be categorised and scatter plots generated for each group. Figure 10 shows a scatter plot for all allocations where one ball was drawn. The plots show the data for both frequency and percentage feedback markets. Note that this scatter includes responses for all stages of the market; so, in frequency markets participants were seeing different levels of total tickets allocated. For each scatter a least squares linear regression is calculated (using data from both frequency and percentage markets in the regression) and is shown as the line in the figure. As expected, the positive slope indicates that increasing levels of public allocation increase the participant's allocation. Table 22 shows the values for the coefficients fit to the model above. The VIF (variance inflation factor -a multicollinearity metric) for the C 3 term is slightly high at 6.25 indicating some of the variance it accounts for is shared by other coefficients. However, the value is less than 10 and does not substantially impact the model validity. The model r 2 is 0.335. The implied univariate regression coefficients derived from this multivariate analysis are shown in Table 23 . Further, qualitative, evidence for individual information integration was obtained from the post exercise survey. After completing the markets, participants were asked 'Did you encounter a situation where there was a contradiction between your private (draw) information and the market information?' A yes and no selection was presented. If the participant selected yes, then they were shown the choices displayed in Table 24 . 31% of the respondents indicated they attempted to integrate public and private data when they had conflicting inputs. 
Concluding remarks
The desire to understand the mechanisms of market information aggregation motivated this study. Experimental prediction markets were used in a large sample study and the results from the markets as well as individuals' actions are analysed. By varying the presence and type of feedback the mechanisms of information collection and information aggregation were studied. Three questions were posed:
Question 1: What are the mechanisms involved in the information integration process?
Information assimilation in feedback markets can be considered to be composed of two mechanisms -information collection and aggregation:
• Collection -the compilation of dispersed information -individuals using their own private information make judgments and act accordingly in the market.
• Aggregation -The market's judgment on the implications of this gathered information -an inductive process. This effect comes from participants integrating public information with their private information in their decision process.
Information collection was studied in isolation in no feedback markets and the results indicated that markets outperform the average of their participants. This provides experimental support for Condorcet's (1785) Jury theorem. The theorem states that for a group making a binary decision by majority rule then if each member's probability of making a correct choice is greater than 1/2 the probability that the group's decision will be correct increases as the number of members of the group increases -approaching 1 as the group grows infinitely large.
Result 2: Feedback markets have an inductive process, above and beyond collection, which allows them to assimilate more information than markets without feedback.
The results also showed that with the addition of feedback, the process of aggregation was present. Aggregation was shown to create agreement in markets (as measured by lower entropy) and drive market results closer to correct values (the known probabilities).
Result 3:
Information mirages are present in markets with feedback. They are an artefact of the inductive process. These mirages are an error mechanism which reduces the market's overall accuracy.
Information mirages were hypothesised as a key failure mechanism and their fingerprint was detected in the research data. It was suggested that the very mechanism of market information aggregation, the inductive portion of information assimilation, can inherently produce mirages based on randomness in the processes. This illustrates that market bubbles in the form or information mirages can come about as the result of statistical variations in private data coupled with rational judgment and decision processes; bubbles need not come from simple irrationality. In this respect, a market subject to mirage prone data resembles a prisoner's dilemma where individual rationality results in collective irrationality.
Question 2. How does the presence and type of feedback impact these mechanisms?
Result 4: The presence and type of feedback can modulate the induction process -more informative feedback increases precision at the cost of accuracy.
A primary result of the present study was that changing the presence and type of feedback supplied to the market can impact market performance because of its impact on this inductive process. The research showed that the presence of feedback increased the precision of the market at the expense of accuracy. The data also suggested that the type of feedback may modulate this process which may allow a prediction market organiser to tailor the market to the specific requirements of their task.
The correctness and discrimination space might be viewed as a market design space. Analogous to portfolios being mapped into a risk/return space, market designs can be mapped into the correctness/discrimination space. Changing the parameters of the market design (in this case presence and type of feedback were tested) can move the market performance in the design space. Other types of designs may move the market's performance to different points in the space. For example, other design parameters might be a parimutuel payout system or a hybrid system which mixes feedback and no-feedback. If all possible designs are mapped in this space an efficient frontier may emerge which would allow a market designer to chose a design which maximises decisiveness at a set level of correctness (or vice versa).
Comparing Result 2 where it was shown that markets with feedback had lower Wurtz distances to the final AIA distribution, and Result 4, where it was shown that no feedback markets had higher correctness, presents an apparent paradox. Both of these results represent measures of accuracy and feedback markets outperformed using the first measure and no-feedback markets outperformed using the second measure. The resolution to the paradox comes from realising that correctness is based on the two stage evaluation. Once a market allocation is judged as correct, additional allocation of tickets to the correct state will not increase the measures of correctness; however, they will decrease the Wurtz distance to final AIA. So, once statistical significance of the result is established, additional gains from the inductive process do not benefit correctness. However, this inductive process does create information mirages which are adversely affecting correctness. This explains how information aggregation is simultaneously increasing accuracy as judged by the Wurtz distance to final AIA and decreasing accuracy as judged by correctness.
Question 3. How do individuals use information and can their processes explain the market level phenomenon?
Result 5: In the absence of feedback, participants allocate above the Bayesian posterior probability in low probability situations and below the Bayesian posterior probability in high probability situations. Figure 9 illustrated that participants over-allocate in low Bayesian probability circumstances and under-allocate in high Bayesian probability circumstances. This behaviour is similar to results seen in psychology experiments where subjects must estimate probabilities over large ranges (Hastie and Dawes, 2001 ). Conservatism and a tendency to follow a MaxiMin strategy may also play a prominent role in this result. By giving a participant 100 tickets to allocate they may view a uniform distribution of tickets as a baseline. That is, they could be guaranteed a payout of 100/6 tickets. With this viewpoint, placing less than this amount on a state that is later determined to be the correct state can be viewed as a loss. Psychological suppositions such as prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) propose asymmetrical and nonlinear gain versus loss utility functions which could lead participants to tend to spread out their bets more than probabilities or maximisation of expected winnings would dictate.
Result 6: In the presence of public data, participants allocate tickets by integrating public and private data.
The way individual participants combine information to make allocations in markets with feedback was studied. Analysis of all feedback market responses using multivariate regression supported the result that public and private information was being integrated by some participants. The modest model r 2 (0.335) indicated the information integration effect at the individual level was rather subtle, and is in contrast to the distinct differences seen in markets with varying levels of feedback. This illustrates that the differences in market performance with feedback are an emergent phenomenon (i.e., one that could not be predicted by analysing only the behaviour of individuals in different market situations).
Summary
The results have expanded the understanding of fundamental market mechanisms discussed in the existing literature. The role of feedback was characterised and the mechanisms of information collection vs. information aggregation more fully understood. The presence of feedback, which enabled the inductive process of information aggregation, simultaneously increased the amount of information assimilated, but also introduced information mirages which tended to decrease accuracy. The data dependent information mirages resemble a prisoner's dilemma where individual rationality results in collective irrationality. Analysis of all individuals' feedback market responses also revealed characteristics of public and private information integration. The integration effect for individuals was subtle compared to the more visible effect in markets, illustrating the emergent character of information aggregation in markets.
